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This article compares the instruments of statecraft used to construct
grand strategies in the early years of the Cold War—the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations—with the Bush administration’s grand
strategy and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It argues that the
Bush strategy relied heavily on the military instrument of statecraft in
attempts of defeating Al-Qaeda and did not develop robust and
concerted diplomatic, psychological and economic tools to undermine
Al-Qaeda’s ideology and influence. The early days of the Cold War hold
valuable lessons for crafting an integrated grand strategy that can fight
both the Al-Qaeda network and its ideology.
Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every
resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence,
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every neces-
sary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror net-
work.
—President George Bush, Speech to the Nation,
September 20, 2001
The current US challenge to craft a grand strategy for fighting the organizations
and ideology fueling the global terrorist threat against the United States is not
new; the Cold War demanded a similar strategy that challenged the Soviet Union
and the spread of communist ideology. This article compares the early years of
the Cold War—the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—with the Bush
administration’s grand strategy and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Specifi-
cally, it investigates the tools of statecraft developed in the early stages of the
Cold War—such as economic development, information campaigns, psychologi-
cal operations (PSYOP), and negotiations—and how the US government knit
together these different tools to form a grand strategy aimed at challenging
Soviet power and the spread of communist ideology. It then describes actions of
the Bush administration to fight Al-Qaeda and its ideology of militant Islam.
The article argues that, when comparing the early years of the Cold War to
the first years of the GWOT, the Bush administration’s grand strategy relied
heavily on the military instrument of statecraft in attempts of defeating Al-Qaeda
and did not develop robust and concerted diplomatic, psychological and eco-
nomic tools to undermine Al-Qaeda’s ideology and influence. The early days of
the Cold War hold valuable lessons for crafting an integrated grand strategy that
can fight both the Al-Qaeda network and its ideology.
 2010 International Studies Association
Foreign Policy Analysis (2010) 6, 237–255
The article is divided into four parts. The first section defines grand strategy
and outlines the tools of statecraft used to realize a county’s grand strategy. The
second section describes the grand strategies developed in the early years of the
Cold War, under Truman and Eisenhower, arguing that these administrations
brought to bear a variety of tools of statecraft to contain both the Soviet Union
and communist ideology, particularly the psychological tool, and developed pro-
grams that were used throughout the 45 years struggle against communism. The
third section investigates the grand strategy employed during the Bush adminis-
tration, noting its reliance on the military and its underemployment of the diplo-
matic and psychological tools of statecraft. And the fourth section suggests steps
that could result in a better US grand strategy in the post-September 11th world.
Grand Strategy, Tools of Statecraft and the Early Years of the Cold War
The current US challenge in crafting a grand strategy aimed at neutralizing mili-
tant Islam bears some similarities to US efforts in creating a grand strategy aimed
at countering communist ideology following the end of World War II. The Uni-
ted States fought the early years of the Cold War with a blend of the instruments
of statecraft and specific tools aimed at containing the Soviet Union and fighting
communist ideology; this approach offers some direction on crafting a grand
strategy to fight the United States’ current foe. The section begins by offering a
definition of grand strategy. It then outlines the four broad instruments of state-
craft—diplomatic, psychological, economic, and military—their purpose, and
examples of actions in each type.
Grand strategy is the means through which a state insures its security. Colonel
R.W. Van de Velde describes statecraft as ‘‘the process through which a nation
attempts to minimize its weaknesses and limitations, and to maximize its
strengths and capabilities in a current international situation’’ (1962:1–6). Politi-
cal scientist Barry Posen defines grand strategy as ‘‘a state’s theory about how it
can best ‘cause’ security for itself…A grand strategy must identify likely threats to
the state’s security and it must devise political, economic, military and other rem-
edies for those threats’’ (1984:13). In its broadest sense, constructing an inte-
grated grand strategy, therefore, requires an understanding of the adversary and
the threats it poses, and the means by which to confront those threats.
Devising a viable, robust grand strategy requires engaging and coordinating a
state’s resources, which are its instruments of statecraft. Van de Velde (1962)
outlines four broad instruments: diplomacy, economics, military, and the psycho-
logical tool of statecraft. He notes that the psychological tool is somewhat contro-
versial and not universally accepted. This observation is echoed by strategic
communications expert Carnes Lord (1989:22–23), who contends that the psy-
chological tool of statecraft is controversial because it implies lying and manipu-
lation, which are unpalatable to Americans. As will be described, however, the
psychological tool of statecraft primarily uses truth and facts in its operations.
Subsequent summaries of the instruments of statecraft have changed the psycho-
logical tool to the information tool, creating the abbreviation DIME. However,
Van de Velde’s description of this tool as psychological is more apt. The goal is
to shape perceptions; information is a means, not an end, to this objective.
The psychological tool of statecraft deserves particular attention because of its
importance in Cold War grand strategies and its potential for US grand strategy
today. The psychological tool aims to influence perceptions of populations and
leaders with the ultimate goal of affecting other states’ actions. Within the psy-
chological tool of statecraft, perhaps the most important operation is public
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is not traditional diplomacy. Whereas traditional
diplomacy involves negotiations between heads of state behind closed doors, a
government uses public diplomacy primarily to influence another country’s
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population; as such it is an open and visible process (Holt and Van de Velde
1960:15; Tuch 1990:3–4). Public diplomacy can include actions such as public
addresses by heads of state or official visits, exchange programs like the
Fullbright scholarship, military-to-military exercises, and military educational pro-
grams with the purpose of fostering relationships across officer corps, mitigating
misperceptions, and increasing transparency (Lord 1989).
Information is another key use of the psychological tool of statecraft. The Uni-
tes States operates various media outlets, including the radio broadcast Voice of
America, television programs, print media and, more recently, web sites. Increas-
ingly, however, the information aspect of the psychological tool is affected by
nongovernmental, globally broadcasted media sources, such as CNN, Fox News,
and even the entertainment industry, which portrays US culture abroad. The
‘‘CNN effect’’ has presented challenges to the United States government and its
ability to manage information for its desired effect (Lord 1989:23–26; Hoffman
2002:83–95).
The military also uses the psychological tool of statecraft. Beginning in the
1950s, the US Army stood up what would later become PSYOP, which focuses
primarily on tactical and operational level information campaigns aimed at shap-
ing perceptions (Lord 1989:15–18). PSYOP actions include leaflets, radio broad-
casts, print media, and television programs.
Coercive diplomacy is another action that yields a psychological effect (Lord
1989:18–19). For example, the use or threat of the use of force has a psychologi-
cal impact on populations. A credible conventional and nuclear deterrent during
the Cold War reassured allies of the United States resolve for protection and dis-
suaded direct Soviet attack against the United States and its interests. The US
government also made use of covert operations with the aim of impacting ene-
mies and allies psychologically. Although many of these actions still remain classi-
fied, the following discussion will touch on some operations in the early days of
the Cold War, such as the efforts made to sway Italy’s 1948 elections away from
the communists, and the psychological impact they had on US enemies and
allies.
Unlike the psychological tool of statecraft, the diplomatic tool differs in its
means of persuasion and its audience. In its traditional form, the diplomatic tool
is used primarily by heads of state in a government and involves dialog and nego-
tiations, usually behind closed doors and sheltered from the public. More
recently, states have engaged in ‘‘track-two diplomacy,’’ which involves elites that
are not state officials. Israeli and Palestinian negotiations between intellectuals,
which eventually opened the way to the 1994 Oslo accords, are an example of
track-two diplomacy.
The economic tool of statecraft can be used through incentives and coercive
policies with the goal of aligning other states toward US interests. Incentives
include, most notably, financial and material aid. Incentives can also include
trade agreements, such as Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, which the US gave
to China in the 1990s. Coercive economic actions include sanctions, tariffs, and
trade embargos. Although these actions are primarily tools of the government,
private sector business also wields influence, particularly since the dawn of pow-
erful Multinational Corporations (MNCs), which have become increasingly
important actors that affect dynamics between states (United Nations 1973). In
times of war, the military also has assets that affect the economic instrument of
statecraft. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, has unique capabilities
that can develop infrastructure in a country, positively impacting its economy.
Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have also been tasked with jumpstarting local
economies through employment programs and small grants (Murphy 2004).
The military tool of statecraft is best defined as the threat or use of force.
The military is the most obvious institution that uses force, but force is not the
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exclusive domain of the military. The intelligence community also has capabili-
ties that allow it to project force with the aim of killing or capturing high value
targets. As will be discussed, covert actions by the intelligence community has
played a key role in US foreign policy, both in the Cold War and today. More
recently, even the private sector has had a hand in the use of force. Specifically,
the US government has hired private security companies as force providers in
certain situations. A recent example is the private US security firm Black Water,
which protected US diplomats in Iraq. The presence of private security compa-
nies, as with MNCs and private worldwide news agencies, has altered the US gov-
ernment’s control over these tools of statecraft.
Finally, Van de Velde (1962:2) argues that the four tools of statecraft can be
divided into two subsets: those that are physical and have measurable effects
(military and economic); and those that are intellectual and harder to measure
(diplomatic and psychological). With the latter subset, people’s perceptions are
the target: ‘‘The moment we accept people as the actors and reactors in interna-
tional affairs, we must accept the fact that these people are guided by their
hearts and minds or by their emotions, or by a combination of both’’ (Van de
Velde 1962:2). The goal of the diplomatic and psychological tools, therefore, is
to influence and shape perceptions of leaders and their populations.
Despite this distinction, Van de Velde contends that the intellectual instru-
ments of statecraft permeate and shape the effects of physical tools, and that the
physical tools can be employed to have an intellectual effect. He notes as an
example, the 1947 Marshall European recovery plan, which engaged the eco-
nomic tool of statecraft but also involved diplomacy and had a psychological
impact on the United States, its allies and adversaries. Likewise, the Berlin Airlift
of 1948–1949 built on diplomatic tools to use military and economic means that
delivered a psychological effect (Van de Velde 1962:3).
Table 1 summarizes the tools of statecraft and examples of actions.
As the following discussion will show, the US government developed robust
programs, through trial and error, and used the different tools of statecraft in
the early years of the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union and counter the
spread of communism. By comparison, in the first 8 years of the GWOT the US
government relied heavily on force as its primary tool of statecraft and did
not develop and employed other instruments, particularly instruments aimed at
shaping perceptions.
Grand Strategy in the Early Years of the Cold War
This section focuses specifically on the grand strategies developed under the Tru-
man and Eisenhower administrations, analyzing their mix of the tools of state-
craft to fight the Cold War. It suggests that these administrations used a mixture
of all four instruments with the aim of not only containing Soviet military capa-
bilities, but also undermining the spread of communist ideology. The early years
of the Cold War demonstrate, in particular, that the Truman and Eisenhower
TABLE 1. Tools of Statecraft
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administrations made efforts to understand their adversary and developed an
array of programs aimed at influencing not only leaders but also their popula-
tions, and allies as well as adversaries.
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States faced a weakened but hos-
tile Soviet Union that held ideologically driven expansionist aims. To counter
this threat, US diplomat George Kennan argued that the United States should
focus on containing the Soviet Union’s capabilities and concentrate on keeping
specific industrial centers—particularly Europe and Japan—from falling into
Soviet hands. The Truman administration ascertained that the United States
could not prosper in a global economic system dominated by the Soviet Union
but—at the same time—that it should avoid direct military confrontation with
the Soviet Union, which could spark another major war. The Truman administra-
tion’s goal, therefore, was to bound Soviet expansionist aims by ‘‘measures short
of war’’; this objective inspired the Truman Doctrine of Containment (Gaddis
1982:25–53; Mitrovich 2000:1).
To fight the Soviet Union without direct military confrontation, the Truman
administration crafted a grand strategy that used an array of tools aimed at
undermining Soviet influence that targeted both Soviet leadership and popula-
tions in Central and Eastern Europe. The US government fought the early years
of the Cold War, therefore, with a mixture of tools employed both defensively
and offensively.
A critical component of Truman’s grand strategy was the Marshall plan, which
aimed to facilitate economic reconstruction of war-torn Europe, particularly
Germany, and to deter the spread of communist ideology in Western Europe
(Leffler 1992:147–164). The Truman administration surmised that reinvigorating
Europe’s economy would serve the United States’ security interests in two inter-
related ways: it would demonstrate US benevolence and values to the world and,
in doing so, it would provide an economic and ideological bulwark against Soviet
expansionist aims into Europe. The Truman administration deemed the Mar-
shall plan a success in preventing the spread of communism into Central Europe
and future generations have heralded the plan as one of the most successful
economic stabilization programs undertaken in modern history (De Long and
Eichengreen 1991; Kuntz 1997; Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell,
Swanger, and Timilsina 2003).
Alongside economic development, the Truman administration focused on
shaping perceptions of the United States and of its foes through the psychologi-
cal instrument of statecraft. In 1949, Truman founded the Fulbright Scholarship
program, which funded cross-cultural education experiences and better under-
standing between scholars in America and the rest of the world. The Truman
administration also launched programs aimed at better understanding the power
dynamics within the Communist Party more broadly, and the Kremlin in particu-
lar, with the hopes of exploiting weaknesses in Soviet leadership (Mitrovich
2000).
Truman’s administration also built on information-based PSYOP undertaken
during World War II, particularly the Office of War Information the Office of
Strategic Services, which were set up to counter German and Italian propaganda
during the war (Tuch 1990:15–16; Cull 2008). The Department of State estab-
lished the Office of International Cultural Affairs in 1946 and continued to
broadcast US news and information through the Voice of America. Simulta-
neously, the CIA broadcasted Radio Free Europe ⁄Radio Liberty to undermine
the Soviet message. In addition to radio broadcasts, the CIA also dropped leaflets
into Central and Eastern Europe to spread their messages and counter Soviet
propaganda (Mitrovich 2000:181–182).
In 1947, Secretary of State Marshall named George Kennan the director of the
newly created Policy Planning Staff (PPS), which sought to develop long-term
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programs aimed at assessing US political and security needs and realizing foreign
policy objectives (Gaddis 1982:25; Mitrovich 2000:23). As head of the PPS, Ken-
nan developed four goals aimed at reducing the Soviet Union’s power and influ-
ence; two of those goals sought to prevent the Soviet Union from solidifying
control of satellite countries in Europe; the other two goals targeted Soviet lead-
ership and aimed to weaken the Kremlin from within (Mitrovich 2000:29).
Under Kennan’s guidance, the US government developed an array of covert
capabilities, ranging from ‘‘psychological warfare’’ tools to e´migre´ covert insur-
gency forces with the aim of creating ‘‘a vigorous and effective ideological pro-
gram’’ aimed at fighting communist ideology (Lucas 1999:58). The goal of these
covert tools was to confront and counter Soviet expansionist aims while maintain-
ing a degree of ‘‘plausible deniability’’ that would allow the US government to
deny direct involvement in these operations (Mitrovich 2000:21; Kennedy and
Lucas 2005:313).
The Truman administration initiated a series of covert operations aimed at
rolling back Soviets influences through ‘‘political warfare’’; operations that were
controversial and mixed in their success. The administration undertook a mas-
sive effort to sway the 1948 elections in Italy away from a communist party victory
(Lucas 1999:43; Osgood 2006:38–40). The PPC, together with the CIA and the
Office for Policy Coordination, spread stories of abuse at the hands of the com-
munist party behind the Iron Curtain through radio broadcasts and newspaper
articles. The PPC also initiated a letter-writing campaign from Italian e´migre´s in
the United States to family members in Italy, encouraging them not to vote for
the communist party. Historian Scott Lucas argues that these efforts hinged on
the conclusion that ‘‘no campaign could rest on economic incentives or political
pressure alone; elections had to be persuaded through propaganda, that Com-
munism was ideologically inferior to a ‘democratic’ system’’ (1999:44). Alongside
these efforts, the PPC launched a ‘‘disinformation program’’ that fabricated
communist party pamphlets and documents (Mitrovich 2000:17–18; Kennedy
and Lucas 2005:313). The Italian Christian Democrat party won the elections by
48.5% of the vote, and the administration deemed the political warfare opera-
tion a success (Mitrovich 2000:18).
As another means of influencing perceptions in Europe, the Truman adminis-
tration established a ‘‘State-private’’ network, which sought, first, to sell the Mar-
shall plan to Europeans and more broadly to fight the Cold War on the
intellectual front. Several philosophers, including John Dewey and Karl Jaspers,
helped form the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which aimed to promote liberal
ideas and check Soviet efforts to spread communism in Europe (Lucas 1999:97–
99). Artists and intellectuals were also sent to the Soviet Union as a means of
positively influencing the population with American art (Kennedy and Lucas
2005:314).
Not all of the Truman administration’s programs were a success. The adminis-
tration attempted to use US trained, covert e´migre´ paramilitary forces to over-
throw weakened communist regimes in Europe. In 1947, the United States and
Britain trained and deployed Albanian e´migre´s into Albania with the objective of
violently overthrowing the government. The operation failed, due in part to a
mole within the force, and the United States was implicated in the operations
(Lucas 1999:66; Mitrovich 2000:43–45.
The Truman administration also overtly weighed in on conflicts in areas of
national security interest to the United States. The United States stepped in to
provide economic and military aid to the Greek monarchy to defeat communist
forces attempting to overthrow the government. Similar aid was extended to Tur-
key with the rationale that it was in the United States’ security interest to keep
these countries from falling to communism (Leffler 1992:73–81). Iran also
became a concern to the United States, and the Truman administration began
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to court the Shah’s government with the aim of keeping Soviet influence from
taking hold, particularly following the advance of Soviet forces to the Iranian
border in 1946 (Leffler 1992:110). Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 inspired fur-
ther efforts to drive a wedge between Communist leaders within the Soviet
Union and those in Satellite countries and China (Gaddis 1982:42–44; Mitrovich
2000:30–42).
The Truman administration also used the diplomatic tool of statecraft to real-
ize its security goals. Western Europe and the United States established NATO in
1949, with the goal of creating a security umbrella against Soviet expansionism.
NATO fostered alliances between free Europe and the United States through
joint military training programs and exercises, weapons sales, and basing privi-
leges, where United States forces could deploy closer to the Soviet Union and
show resolve for defending Europe (Gaddis 1982:72–76).
Under the Truman administration, nuclear weapons had yet to fully develop
into a robust deterrent, and debates loomed over their proper use in statecraft.
The Soviet Union’s successful detonation of a nuclear device on August 12, 1949
altered the United States’ perception of nuclear war, raising questions about the
Soviet’s ability to strike the United States and the United States’ ability to strike
back with a preponderance of force. This new dynamic gave added impetus to
undermining the Soviet Union through measures ‘‘short of war’’ (Gaddis
1982:79–83; Mitrovich 2000:186–188).
Conventional military force also played a role in Truman’s grand strategy, spe-
cifically through the deployment of forces in Europe and Japan and ultimately
through the Korean War. In the immediate years following World War II, the US
government drew down its conventional forces to a fraction of its wartime
strength. The outbreak of war in Korea reinvigorated the need for conventional
military power and further underscored the perils of direct military confronta-
tion in a nuclear age (Gaddis 1982:168).
The Truman Doctrine, which sought to focus on containing the Soviet
Union’s capabilities and rolling back communism’s appeal in key areas of vital
security interest to the United States, crafted a grand strategy that developed and
blended diplomatic, psychological, economic, and military tools. Hindsight shows
that this was a period of experimentation, where multiple programs were devel-
oped with the aim of checking the security threat posed by both Soviet power
and communist ideology. Not all of the programs worked, but these early efforts
established a foundation of tools upon which future administrations could draw
to formulate new strategies for fighting the Cold War, including the Eisenhower
administration.
The escalation of Soviet nuclear capabilities, the emergence of Communist
China, the stalemate of the Korean War and a new administration in 1953
prompted a shift in US grand strategy toward a more force-driven posture than
Kennan’s original argument of containment. Eisenhower’s ‘‘New Look’’—ensh-
rined in NSC-68—defined communist ideology as a threat wherever it arose and
propelled the United States into checking communist movements beyond Ken-
nan’s critical centers of industrial power.
Eisenhower aimed to get at what he called the ‘‘Great Equation’’ for US grand
strategy: ‘‘Spiritual force, multiplied by economic force, multiplied by military
force, is roughly equal to security’’ (Osgood 2006:54). On its face, Eisenhower’s
grand strategy relied heavily on the threat of nuclear confrontation. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles (1954) announced in a speech to the Council on For-
eign Relations that the new administration promised ‘‘massive retaliation’’ for
any Soviet use of nuclear weapons against the United States and its interests:
The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to
respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. So long as our
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basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in
building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and
method of warfare—and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meet-
ing aggression by direct and local opposition—then we needed to be ready to
fight in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by
sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons…. (1954)
Despite its more aggressive posture, Eisenhower also made psychological and dip-
lomatic tools a cornerstone of his grand strategy. Cold War historian Kenneth
Osgood argues that, building on his experiences with psychological warfare in
World War II, Eisenhower argued that:
…the battle for hearts and minds would be a long-term enterprise, involving a
wide range of activities to enhance U.S. influence and spread American ideals of
democracy and free enterprise. [Eisenhower:] ‘‘It is not merely the beaming out
of facts. I would encourage the exchange of students, of scientists, of doctors, of
instructors, of even theologians; anything you could think of that would tend to
carry back into these various countries an understanding of what we are doing
and just how we live…I believe it should go into the fields of art, science, and
everything.’’ (2006:51)
To this end, the administration consolidated information-based assets under the
United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, which aimed to ‘‘tell Amer-
ica’s story to the world,’’ and interdict the spread of communist ideology by
informing other countries of US culture and policy through public diplomacy.
In addition to governing the Fulbright Scholarship program and Voice of Amer-
ica, USIA developed programs in education, arts, music, literature, television,
movies, and other efforts aimed at promoting the United States’ image abroad.
The administration also launched a commercial advertising-crafted campaign
that sabotaged the Communist message (Gaddis 1982:154–155; Osgood 2006:46–
103; Cull 2008:90–91).1
Building on the programs established under Truman, the Eisenhower adminis-
trations further developed covert psychological tools aimed at undermining com-
munist leadership. Eisenhower launched a series of operations following the
death of Stalin in 1953 that attempted to sow seeds of mistrust and discontent
within the Politburo, including Operation Overload, Delay and Cancellation.
The US government also initiated Operation Engross, which encouraged high-
level members of the Communist party to defect and weaken the resolve of the
leadership (Mitrovich 2000:184).
Eisenhower also oversaw programs to fostered covert and overt actions that
attempted to foment uprisings in Poland and Hungary, eventually culminating
with the failed revolution in Hungary in 1956 (Gati 2006). The Eisenhower
administration used ‘‘unconventional warfare’’—covert operations aimed at
deposing or maintaining desired leaders with a country as a means of checking
the spread of communism. This included aiding a coup d’e´tat in Iran in 1953,
and a coup in Guatemala in 1954. The Eisenhower administration also inter-
vened to influence the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, and to keep the administra-
tion in Lebanon pro-United States in 1958 (Gaddis 1982:177; Osgood
2006:138–150).
Alongside these efforts to undermine communism internationally, Eisenhower
engaged the diplomatic tool of statecraft through dialog with the Soviet Union,
1 Subsequent administrations developed additional psychological tools to complement these assets, including
Kennedy’s implementation of the Peace Corps shortly after taking office in 1961, which aimed to share US exper-
tise to the developing world.
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beginning in 1953, which helped pave the way for further diplomatic exchanges
between the two powers (Gaddis 1982:159: Osgood 2006:60). Cold War historian
Gregory Mitrovich (2000:188) argues that dramatic changes in the geo-strategic
environment between the United States and the Soviet Union—particularly the
Soviet Union’s development of thermonuclear weapons—compelled the Eisen-
hower administration to begin dialog with the Soviet Union as a necessary means
of deescalating tensions and preventing nuclear war.
Revisiting US grand strategies during the early years of the Cold War reveals
important lessons for crafting US foreign policy in the post-September 11 world.
First, the US grand strategies during the Truman and Eisenhower administra-
tions always drew on a mixture of statecraft’s tools, including actions such as con-
ventional military power, covert operations, reconstruction and development,
public diplomacy and informational programs, and diplomatic negotiations. Sub-
sequent administrations further blended the tools of statecraft to create grand
strategies aimed at defending the United States’ security and prosperity in the
face of the threat caused by the Soviet Union and communist expansion around
the globe.
Arguably, the Truman administration developed the bulk of the programs
used throughout the duration of the Cold War. These assets included the ambi-
tious reconstruction and economic development initiatives of the Marshall Plan,
public diplomacy and information programs embedded in the State Department,
and sincere efforts to understand the United State’s real and potential adversar-
ies through the cross-cultural academic exchange envisioned in the Fulbright
Scholarship program. Simultaneously, the Truman administration used the mili-
tary tool, including both conventional and nuclear deterrence, military confron-
tation in Korea, and covert operations in Europe, Latin American, and the
Middle East (employing both the psychological tool and force). The United
States, in other words, fought the Cold War with more than the military tool
of statecraft and the threat of nuclear war; it brought to bear a wide array
of resources that contained Soviet expansion and undermine the spread of
communist ideologies, particularly into Western Europe.
Second, US grand strategy was not fixed during the Cold War; rather, different
administrations blended the tools of statecraft according to developments in the
geo-strategic environment, technological advances, and their understandings of
the adversary. The Truman Doctrine amassed economic, psychological and con-
ventional military power, and an emerging nuclear deterrent with the goal of
containing the Soviet Union and, specifically, denying its expansion into the
industrially developed centers of Europe, Japan, and Korea. The Eisenhower
administration adopted a more aggressive grand strategy, promising to check
communist movements, wherever they arose and building a nuclear deterrent
based on massive retaliation.
The programs developed under Truman and Eisenhower provided the founda-
tion for future administrations during the Cold War. For example, Kennedy
responded to the rise in communist-inspired insurgent activities with a US coun-
terinsurgency capability and retooled the US nuclear deterrent following several
close calls that challenged the efficacy of massive attack. The Johnson administra-
tion relied most heavily on conventional forces to fight the Cold War, specifically
through the war in Vietnam. In response, the Nixon, Ford and Carter adminis-
trations swung back toward a less-military dominant foreign policy, and crafted
their grand strategies around negotiations and Detente. The Reagan administra-
tion adopted perhaps the most overtly offensive grand strategy, promising to
‘‘roll back’’ communism and ultimately defeat it.
Ultimately, both the Soviet Union and communist ideology were defeat
through a mixture of the tools of statecraft, not through military means alone. It
took roughly 45 years to win the war.
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US Grand Strategy Post-September 11
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC,
President Bush announced that the United States would execute a GWOT with
the aim of routing out terrorist entities wherever they existed and, specifically,
dismantling Al-Qaeda: ‘‘Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated’’ (2001). To this end, the Bush administration has
targeted Al-Qaeda’s leadership and executed two wars—Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq—-
with the aim of denying assets to global-minded terrorists. The United States
continues to grapple with the threat posed by militant Islam and how to devise a
grand strategy for ensuring US security and prosperity. The early years of the
Cold War offer useful insights for fighting this new threat posed by Al-Qaeda
and its ideology. In particular, the psychological programs developed to counter
communist ideology and explain the United States and its intentions are neces-
sary tools for fighting this new global threat. Successfully deploying these tools
requires better understanding the adversary and the nature of the threat.
The Cold War and the GWOT have important differences and similarities that
may affect the applicability of employing the former war’s strategies to the pres-
ent global threat. Perhaps the most important difference between wars is that
the Cold War was more state-centric focused than the GWOT. The Soviet Union,
China, Cuba, and other communist powers resided within state structures. The
tools of statecraft could therefore be employed to deter, coerce and compel
these states’ leaders and assets. The GWOT, while including some state actors,
operates primarily on the sub-state and trans-state levels; this requires new strate-
gies of coercion and compellence. Alongside this difference, nuclear deter-
rence—one of the pillars that shaped Cold War strategic thinking and
interaction—is no longer applicable as it was in the Cold War; nuclear confronta-
tion is unlikely to deter nonstate actors. Finally, transnational terrorism does not
appear to be a threat to major industrial powers as the Soviet Union and China
were during the Cold War. Perhaps the greatest industrial threat posed by
Al-Qaeda and like-minded Islamic insurgents is the disruption of oil from the
Middle East. While important, this does not appear to be as great a threat as
Soviet and Chinese expansion was in the 1950s.
However, there are important similarities between the Cold War and the cur-
rent global terrorist threat that give the foreign policy tools developed during
the Cold War relevance today. Perhaps most importantly, both wars contain ide-
ologies that are antithetical and hostile toward the United States and require
strategies aimed at de-legitimating their message. The Cold War ended not only
with the defeat of the Soviet Union, but also the defeat of communist ideology
and the wide-scale rejection of its tenets by populations around the globe. The
fight against Al-Qaeda demands a similar debunking of militant Islamist ideology
to neutralize the threat it poses to the United States. Second, the adversaries in
the Cold War and the GWOT both have global reach. Communist ideologies
were a global threat, spanning from Europe to East Asia, Africa to Latin America.
Similarly, militant Islamist ideologies and their organizations are popping up in
virtually every corner of the globe. Third, communism and militant Islam are
both long-term adversaries. The Cold War lasted almost 50 years—nearly two
generations—likewise, it is prudent to assume that militant Islam will take at least
a generation or two to discredit. Finally, the Cold War was not won through mili-
tary power alone. As previously described, the United States brought to bear all
the tools of statecraft to defeat the Soviet Union and undermine communist ide-
ologies. Similarly, neither can this global war be won through military power
alone.
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Shortly after the beginning of the GWOT, the Bush administration issued the
2002 National Security Strategy, which outlined the administration’s vision for
ensuring US security. The executive summary of the strategy names defeating ter-
rorism as the nation’s priority: ‘‘To defeat this threat we must make use of every
tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defense, law enforcement,
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing’’ (White House
2002, i). Critically, the NSS does not name the psychological or diplomatic tools
as key instruments for fighting the threat posed by terrorism.
The Bush administration relied heavily on the military instrument of statecraft
to realize this National Security Strategy. The GWOT began with a military cam-
paign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that aimed to destroy its author-
ity and the sanctuary it had provided the leadership of Al-Qaeda. In the near
term, OEF accomplished both these pursuits, toppling the Taliban in a matter of
weeks and scattering Al-Qaeda’s leadership. However, more recent analysis of
Al-Qaeda’s organizational structure suggests that, while OEF denied the organiza-
tion a safe haven in Afghanistan, key leaders have continued to hold some opera-
tional control over the organization in neighboring Pakistan, particularly in the
lawless Northwest Frontier Province. Similarly, the Taliban has regrouped and is
now reasserting itself both politically and militarily in Afghanistan. It appears,
therefore, that OEF achieved its goals in the near term, but has since lost the
initiative.
The Bush administration also used the military instrument of statecraft to tar-
get Iraq. As early as September 12, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fin-
gered Saddam Hussein as an accomplice in the terrorist attacks and began
calling for his removal. These assertions culminated with a 2003 ground invasion
against Saddam Hussein based, in part, on a believed connection between the
dictator and the terrorist threat posed by the Al-Qaeda network (CBSNews
Online 2002).
Operation Iraqi Freedom was a counterproductive move in the GWOT for
three broad reasons. First, the international community largely rejected the Uni-
ted States’ reasons for initiating OIF—to stamp out Iraq’s purported Weapons of
Mass Destruction capabilities and connections to Al-Qaeda—which opened the
way for conspiracy theories on the ‘‘real causes’’ of the US offensive, ranging
from oil to Bush family vendettas against Saddam Hussein (Farrell 2006). The
war also strained US relations with its allies. Second, OIF helped fulfill the
prophecies of Al-Qaeda’s ideology, which claims that the United States is out to
destroy Islam, through its support of apostate regimes, its ‘‘occupation’’ of Saudi
Arabia, and now its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (bin Laden 1996). Third,
Iraq became a magnet and training ground for the Al-Qaeda network; prior to
the Anbar Awakening and the Surge, the instability in Iraq allowed for Al-Qaeda
to set up a presence in the country, ironically making it the safe haven that the
US government aimed to destroy.
In addition to the military campaigns of OEF and OIF, the GWOT also tar-
geted the core leadership of Al-Qaeda. The FBI named bin Laden as its most
wanted man in addition to identifying around 20 of his associates as targets of
the GWOT (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2007). Within the first 2 years of
September 11, the United States killed or captured nearly 20 core members,
including the believed number three in command Muhammad Atef (killed in
Afghanistan as part of OEF in 2001), his replacement Abu Zubaydah (captured
in Pakistan in 2002), his replacement and believed architect of the September
11 attacks Khaled Sheikh Muhammad (captured in Pakistan in 2003), al-Nashiri,
the operations chief and believed designer of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in
Africa and the 2000 attack on the USS COLE (captured in the Arabian peninsula
in 2002), and the capture of abd al-Haidi al-Iraqi, the operations chief of
Al-Qaeda, who was apprehended trying to enter Iraq in April 2007 (Global
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Security.org 2010). Killing or capturing Al-Qaeda leadership continues to be a
key strategy in the war against militant Islam.
The US government employed other instruments of statecraft in the GWOT,
but these tools were few in comparison to its use of force. Within weeks of Sep-
tember 11, the US government targeted bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s financial
assets as a means of disrupting their terrorist capabilities. The Patriot Act, which
President Bush signed into law on October 26, 2002, aims to—among other
things—arrest patterns of terrorist financing. The Bush administration has
claimed some success in freezing around $138 billion in terrorist financial assets;
however, lack of international regulations and compliance coupled with unoffi-
cial means of transmitting money, such as the hawallah system, have hindered
efforts to thoroughly block terrorist financing (Farah 2003).
Perhaps the single greatest difference between the grand strategies at the
beginning of the Cold War and grand strategy under the Bush administration
was the lack of a public diplomacy campaign. In the months following the
attacks in Washington, DC and New York, the Bush administration attempted an
information campaign aimed at promoting the United States’ image abroad.
The Bush administration hired Charlotte Beers, a New York-based advertisement
executive, to work on promoting a better image of the United States to the
Muslim world. Under Beers’ direction, the State Department produced docu-
mentaries on Muslims in America to be distributed abroad, and launched Radio
Sawa, an Arabic-language radio station broadcasted throughout the Middle East.
Beers resigned in March 2003 after her campaign was criticized for not under-
standing its target audience and achieving little to no visible results (Starr 2001;
De Young 2002; CNN.com 2003).
The State department also created the Office of Global Communications,
headed by former US ambassador to Morocco, Margaret Tutwiler, with the aim
of better explaining US foreign policies to the Muslim world and countering
anti-US propaganda from Al-Qaeda and others. In the fall of 2005, her successor,
Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes, traveled to the Arabian Peninsula in an
effort to meet with various populations and promote the United States’ image in
the region. Her tour received a mixed reception, prompting some women in
Saudi Arabia to argue that they did not need an American woman telling them
how to live their lives (Marquis 2004; Weisman 2005).
These efforts show that the United States’ use of the psychological tool of
statecraft was thin in the GWOT. The initial public diplomacy programs suggest
that the US government has not taken time to understand its audience. In the
early years of the Cold War, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations began
with programs that aimed to better understand citizens in the Soviet Union and
its satellite countries, and Soviet leadership. This knowledge allowed these
administrations to tailor its message to these audiences more effectively.
The United States government’s weak public diplomacy campaign, coupled
with a military dominant grand strategy, had disastrous consequences for the US
image abroad. In particular, the Bush administration did not succeed in explain-
ing or justifying US actions in the GWOT to the Muslim world. Post-September
11 polling data is particularly illustrative of this problem. Surveys conducted by
Pew and Gallup have found a pervasive overall attitude of ‘‘anti-American senti-
ment’’ throughout the Muslim world and in the Middle East in particular. The
region’s ill feelings toward the United States are more pronounced in response
to its foreign policy than its culture and values. In 2002, Gallup polled nine
countries in ‘‘the Islamic world,’’ including Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jor-
dan, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Morocco and Indonesia, to measure attitudes toward
the United States and its foreign policy actions. It found that ‘‘In every nation in
which this question was asked, including Turkey, a majority of those interviewed
expressed the view that the American military action [in Afghanistan] is either
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largely or completely unjustifiable’’ (Gallup 2002). A 2002 Pew global survey con-
cludes: ‘‘In general, antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by what
it does in the international arena than by what it stands for politically and econom-
ically’’ (2002:69).
Negative sentiment over US foreign policy was particularly acute in regard to
US military operations in Iraq. Prior to the war, in 2002, Pew surveyed countries
throughout the world regarding support for armed conflict against Saddam Hus-
sein and found that the overwhelming majority of countries surveyed did not
support military action against Iraq (2002; Center for Strategic Studies (Jordan)
(2005); Telhami 2005). Pew also polled Turks on their attitudes toward a war in
Iraq and, specifically, the prospects of the US military using its bases in Turkey
to conduct the war. It found that ‘‘Fully 83% of Turks oppose allowing US forces
to use their country, a NATO ally, to wage war on Iraq. Further, a 53% majority
of Turkish respondents believe the United States wants to get rid of Saddam
Hussein as part of a war against unfriendly Muslim countries, rather than
because the Iraqi leader is a threat to peace’’(Pew 2002).
In April 2003, Pew surveyed countries on perceptions of OIF and found that
favorable ratings for the United States to be ‘‘far below levels measured in 2002
and 2000;’’ ratings in Turkey, Jordan and Palestine fell to the teens (Pew 2003).
A 2004 survey found that ‘‘While populations of predominately Muslim countries
are not averse to democracy, they are skeptical of the [Bush] administration’s
goal of promoting democracy in the Middle East. The war in Iraq has only
intensified these doubts; in March 2004, majorities in Turkey, Jordan, Morocco,
and Pakistan said the war made them less confident that the United States wants
to promote democracy’’ (Pew 2005c:119). More broadly, Pew surveys have found
that in several countries—including Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, and
Turkey—a majority of citizens perceive the US military as threatening and
fear US military actions against their own state (Pew 2005a; Pew Foundation
2005c). A 2007 Pew survey found that: ‘‘the overall US image remains abysmal
in predominately Muslim countries. Notably, solid majorities in every largely
Muslim country surveyed—as well as in the Palestinian territories—also say they
are very or somewhat worried that the US could be a military threat’’(Pew
2007:55).
These polling data suggest that the Bush administration’s use of the military
instrument of statecraft and its desires to positively shape perceptions in the
Muslim world were at cross purposes. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in par-
ticular, generated fear and suspicion over US intentions toward Muslims. These
fears support the United States’ adversaries, who claim that the United States is
out to destroy the Muslim world and, therefore, must be fought to defend the
faith.
In 2006, the Bush administration issued a second National Security Strategy.
While the 2006 strategy contains an almost identical table of contents to the
2002 document, the new executive summary specifies two pillars for security:
‘‘promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to
promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair
trade and wise development policies’’; and, ‘‘confronting the challenges of our
time by leading a growing community of democracies’’ (White House 2006:
p. ii). The 2006 National Security Strategy, in other words, made democratization
the cornerstone to transforming the global security environment and insuring
US security. This strategy, while still stressing the importance of defeating the
global terrorist threat to the United States, named economic development and
human rights as the best means of defeating terrorism in the long run.
Following the 2006 National Security Strategy, in June 2007—nearly 6 years
after September 11—the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy
Coordinating Center (PCC) of the State Department issued the US National
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Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, which aimed to set
the agenda for an information campaign in the GWOT. The document stresses
the importance of emphasizing the United States’ values to the world through
promoting: ‘‘democratization… amplifying mainstream Muslim voices…isolating
and discrediting terrorist leaders…deligitimizing terror…[and] demonstrating
that the West is open to all religions and is not in conflict with any faith’’ (U.S.
Department of State 2007a,b:3). The document is valuable for envisioning the
kind of message the United States should be promoting; the report, however, is
unclear as to which government agencies will spread this message and by what
means or how this message will compliment or compete with information spread
by the media and private enterprises such as the entertainment industry. Without
these details in place, implementing the strategic vision remains suspect.
What is Needed to Craft a Better Grand Strategy for the GWOT
Following the September 11 attacks, several international relations scholars
weighed in on how to construct a grand strategy aimed at insuring US security
in the face of this new adversary. Political scientist Robert Art argues that grand
strategy, by its very nature, is built around the tool of military power and that
the other instruments of statecraft fall in the realm of foreign policy (2003:1–2).
Stephen Biddle (2005) argues that the United States has two broad policy
options for fighting militant Islam in the post-September 11 world—rollback or
containment. Rollback requires aggressive policies of nation-building, great
power competition and great commitment in the near term with the potential
for defeating the terrorist threat in the long run. Containment demands fewer
aggressive policies up front and could reduce near-term confrontations with
great powers and WMD use by terrorists, but could allow for the root causes of
Islamic militancy to go untreated.
Historian John Lewis Gaddis contends that US grand strategy under the Bush
administration focused heavily on the military tool of statecraft. In particular, the
Bush administration used the Cold War definition of pre-emptive war, which
includes preventive war—military action taken to reduce the possible develop-
ment of hostile action—to declare war on Iraq:
To wait for terrorist threats to become clear and present was to leave the nation
vulnerable to surprise attacks. Instead, the United States would go after states
that had harbored, or that might be harboring, terrorist gangs. It would at first
seek to contain or deter such regimes—the familiar means by which the Cold
War had been fought—but if those methods failed, it reserved the right to pre-
empt perceived dangers by starting a preventive war (2005:3).
Gaddis argues that, while military action in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate
that the United States will not retreat from the region, other instruments of
statecraft are needed to reduce the threat of transnational terrorism to the Uni-
ted States. Gaddis notes, in particular, that ‘‘Grand strategy is as much about psy-
chology as it is facts on the ground’’ and that more effort is required in the
realm of diplomacy and reestablishing international legitimacy (2005:6).
The persistence of Al-Qaeda directed and inspired operations coupled with
the limited-at-best success of denying Al-Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan and
Pakistan suggest that military power alone will not counter this post-Cold War
security threat. The Bush administration’s strategy neither eradicated terrorist
organizations nor did it undermine the ideology that inspired these groups to
act. In fact, evidence suggests that the military dominant strategy may actually
have fueled Al-Qaeda’s ideology, fulfilling its prophecies instead of undermining
them.
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If the United States’ grand strategy—including the military strategy of denying
Al-Qaeda safe haven and taking out its leadership, coupled with the absence of a
thorough public diplomacy plan—was as ineffective as polling data suggest, what
drove this disjointed approach toward the war against Al-Qaeda?
Lessons from the Cold War suggest several possible answers. First, various
administrations’ perception of the enemy and how best to defeat that enemy
played a significant role in shaping grand strategy postures; post-September 11
grand strategy is no exception. The Bush administration appears to have
believed that Al-Qaeda could be defeated through force and, more broadly, that
the Muslim world would be deterred by overwhelming military might. In the
months following September 11, the Bush administration reached out to several
well-known scholars of the Middle East, particularly the British-born and trained
historian Bernard Lewis. Lewis argues that Arabs are in a state of crisis and
unwilling to look within their own ranks for the causes of this crisis, pointing
instead to the legacy of colonialism and current US hegemony as the source of
their suffering. This argument, coined the ‘‘Lewis Doctrine,’’ contends that a vic-
tim mentality has caused Arab and Muslim society to stagnate; a strong, forceful
response from the United States will propel the Muslim world into modernity,
including the transition for autocratic to democratic societies. The Lewis Doc-
trine goes on to assert that, in order for the United States to counter the threat
of militant Islam, it needs to stand firm, show force and—above all—not appease
Arab discontent. Under this perception of the problem, conventional military
force is a natural policy choice; Lewis supported the war in Iraq as a necessary
step of standing firm against militant Islam, and imposing progress on a stag-
nated region of the world (Waldman 2004).
Critics of the Lewis doctrine point out that the war in Iraq had the opposite
effect on Muslim society; rather than cow the region into submission and spark
political and social progress, the war fueled insurgency, unrest, and fed the ideol-
ogy of Islamic extremists, who ague that the United States is out to destroy their
faith (Hirsh 2004). Moreover, one of the most free and fair elections in the Mid-
dle East brought the militant Islamic group Hamas to power in Palestine in
2006; elections did not usher in the tolerance and modernity predicted by Lewis
(‘‘Protecting Free Elections for Palestinians 2006’’). Thus, the Bush administra-
tion’s perception of its adversary and how to defeat it—enshrined in the Lewis
doctrine—was misguided.
Second, building on the lessons of the Cold War, the Bush administration
should have been developing programs that use the other tools of statecraft with
the aim of fighting not only the Al-Qaeda network, but also its ideology and
appeal to Muslims around the globe. It is important to note that the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations developed the bulk of the diplomatic and psy-
chological tools of statecraft used during the Cold War; in other words, they
developed these capabilities in the early stages of the conflict, recognizing that
the military tool alone would not defeat the Soviet Union and communist ideol-
ogy. Moreover, the Truman administration did not develop its diplomatic and
psychological capabilities from scratch; it built on existing institutions developed
to fight Fascist ideology during World War II, such as Voice of America.
The Obama administration should use the lessons learned fighting the United
State’s previous global threat and adapt diplomatic and psychological tools devel-
oped during the Cold War to fight Al-Qaeda and its ideology. First and perhaps
foremost, the US government needs to devote more time and resources to
understanding the nature of the threat. Post-September 11, the enemy appeared
to be a radical, militant interpretation of Sunni Islam, often referred to as
Wahabbism or Salafism (Wictorowicz 2006). Seven years on, however, Shia Islamic
movements, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, are also a threat to the United
States and its interests. What are the connections between Wahhabism and Shia
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Islam? What unites these movements, what divides them? Clearly the United
States government is still struggling to get its arms around the nature of the
threat and on which groups in the Muslim world the United States should focus
and why.
More recent scholarship suggests that the Muslim world is going through a
revival or reformation, not unlike the Christian Reformation that shook the
foundations of Europe and resulted in nearly 200 years of intra-Christian blood-
shed over the origins and nature of religious and political authority (Maghraoui
2006). If true, militant Islamists like Al-Qaeda may represent one end of the
spectrum, calling for a radical ‘‘return’’ to the early days of the faith when one
leader spoke for the entire Muslim community; and with reformists at the other
end of the spectrum, who are attempting to reconcile Islam with modernity and
democracy. In the middle are the majority of Muslims around the globe, who
practice their faith and are attempting to live their lives in dignity, unsure which
ideology will best allow them to do this.
Presenting the current battle for Islam in these terms suggests several impor-
tant implications for US grand strategy. First and foremost, it is important to bet-
ter understand support for bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s message. Who is buying it?
Why? How does the United States interdict the ideology of militant Islam? Poll-
ing data reveals some important hints to these questions. A 2003 Pew survey
showed that 55% of Jordanians and 45% of Pakistanis gave bin Laden a favorable
rating, while only 15% of Turks concurred with this view (Pew 2005b:29). In
2004, 65% in Pakistan rated Osama bin Laden favorably, and 55% in Jordan con-
curred with this; only 11% of respondents in Turkey gave bin Laden a favorable
rating, however (Pew 2004:21). Polling in 2005 revealed that support for bin
Laden had fallen overall, alongside waning support for acts of terrorism in Iraq
and Palestine, but favorable ratings toward bin Laden had rose to 60% in Jordan,
while declining to 51% in Pakistan and 7% in Turkey (Pew 2005b:29). Clearly
bin Laden’s actions were positively resonating with a portion of the Muslim
world. The question remains: Why? What part of bin Laden’s message was earn-
ing him favorable ratings with these populations. How can the United States
craft its foreign policy to change these numbers and de-legitimatize bin Laden’s
message and actions?
Second, crafting a successful grand strategy requires clearly understanding
the threat and engaging the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, psychological, and
economic as well as military—to counter the threat and insure US security
and prosperity. The 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Ter-
rorism states: ‘‘In the GWOT, violent extremism—in its various forms—is the
primary threat to the United States, its allies, and interests’’ (Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006:3). The Plan further states: ‘‘The national strategic
aims are to defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free
and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent
extremists and all who support them’’ (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2006:5). The plan goes on to stress the need for interagency support in wag-
ing the GWOT, and the importance of fighting the enemy not only through
military means but also through humanitarian assistance, alliances formation,
and military-to-military contacts (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2006:7).
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, while naming
the threat and the means for countering it, does not identify exactly who the ter-
rorists are, or their goals. The United States government cannot answer this
question without better understanding its enemy and the nature of the threat.
The Truman administration spent considerable energy investing in better
understanding its adversary in the early years of the Cold War, including
research on the nature of the communist party and Soviet leadership, and
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vulnerable populations in central Europe. The GWOT requires this attention to
the enemy to craft a better grand strategy.
Finally, the United States needs to target militants without alienating the silent
Muslim majority or its non-Muslim allies, and support reformists without de-
legitimating their cause. Using primarily the military tool of statecraft will not
achieve this end. In fact, force alone appears to be undermining these goals. The US
government needs to better utilize the other tools of statecraft to achieve these ends.
A necessary first step in developing better diplomatic and psychological tools
is the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication state-
ment. Along side this effort, the government needs to develop more intellectual
tools that can implement this vision. To do this, the United States needs to allo-
cate more money to developing these tools, something that the 2007 budget
reflected with a significant increase in funds to public diplomacy programs
(Epstein 2006). It also needs to better understand the exact nature of the prob-
lem and develop metrics that can show changes in perceptions (Government
Accountability Office 2003). This is neither an impossible or unprecedented task;
the Cold War offers valuable lessons that can help pave the way.
Finally, it is important to note that developing tools other than force for fight-
ing the GWOT is not a bid for isolationism; the United States needs to remain
active in the new security environment and the threat posed by militant interpre-
tations of Islam. Evidence from the Cold War suggests that it can do this through
a better utilization of the tools of statecraft.
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